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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
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NO. 45981
CASSIA COUNTY NO. CR-2017-2963

APPELLANT’S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Following his guilty plea to driving under the influence (“DUI”), the district court
sentenced Florencio Aguinaga to eight years, with two years fixed. Mr. Aguinaga appeals, and he
asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The State charged Mr. Aguinaga with a felony DUI and two misdemeanor offenses for
driving without privileges and failure to show proof of insurance. (R., pp.39–41.) Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Mr. Aguinaga pled guilty to the DUI, and the State agreed to dismiss the
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remaining charges. (R., pp.81–83; Tr. Vol. I,1 p.4, L.24–p.5, L.9, p.11, L.6–p.13, L.9.) The State
also agreed to recommend a sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, and a period of
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.81–82.) Mr. Aguinaga subsequently applied for participation in DUI
Court. (R., pp.90–92.) He was accepted into the program. (R., p.103.)
At sentencing, the State made a recommendation consistent with the plea agreement.
(Tr. Vol. II, p.5, Ls.16–21.) Mr. Aguinaga requested a suspended sentence and probation so he
could participate in DUI Court. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.8–10.) The district court sentenced him to
eight years, with two years fixed. (Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.7–9.) The district court declined to retain
jurisdiction or suspend the sentence. (See Tr. Vol. II, p.17, Ls.2–3.) Mr. Aguinaga timely
appealed from the district court’s judgment of conviction. (R., pp.108–09, 116–17.)

ISSUE
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with
two years fixed, upon Mr. Aguinaga, following his DUI guilty plea?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Eight Years,
With Two Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Aguinaga, Following His DUI Guilty Plea
“It is well-established that ‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant has
the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing the
sentence.’” State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5 (2010) (quoting State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997) (alteration in original)). Here, Mr. Aguinaga’s sentence does not exceed the statutory
maximum. See I.C. § 18-8005(6)(a), (9) (ten year maximum). Accordingly, to show that the
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There are two transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the entry of plea
hearing. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the sentencing hearing.
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sentence imposed was unreasonable, Mr. Aguinaga “must show that the sentence, in light of the
governing criteria, is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts.” State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 460 (2002).
“‘Reasonableness’ of a sentence implies that a term of confinement should be tailored to
the purpose for which the sentence is imposed.” State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 483 (2012)
(quoting State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148 (2008)).
In examining the reasonableness of a sentence, the Court conducts an independent
review of the entire record available to the trial court at sentencing, focusing on
the objectives of criminal punishment: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of
the individual and the public; (3) possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment
or retribution for wrongdoing.
Stevens, 146 Idaho at 148. “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the
primary objective of protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of
deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution.” State v. Delling, 152 Idaho 122, 132 (2011).
“The primary purpose of the retained jurisdiction program is to enable the trial court to
gain additional information regarding the defendant’s rehabilitative potential and suitability for
probation.” State v. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676 (Ct. App. 2005). “[P]robation is the ultimate
objective of a defendant who is on retained jurisdiction.” Id. at 677. The district court’s decision
to retain jurisdiction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Id. “There can be no abuse of
discretion in a trial court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the court already has sufficient
information upon which to conclude that the defendant is not a suitable candidate for probation.”
Id. Similarly, “[t]he choice of probation, among available sentencing alternatives, is committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court . . . .” State v. Landreth, 118 Idaho 613, 615 (Ct. App.
1990).
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In this case, Mr. Aguinaga asserts the district court abused its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence under any reasonable view of the facts. Specifically, he contends the district
court should have sentenced him to a lesser term of imprisonment, retained jurisdiction, or
suspended his sentence in order for him to participate in DUI Court. The mitigating factors,
including his pre-sentencing behavior, employment, support network, and commitment to his
sobriety, supported a more lenient sentence for Mr. Aguinaga.
Since the instant offense, Mr. Aguinaga demonstrated to the district court that he was
ready to get sober and become a productive member of society. Mr. Aguinaga had been released
from custody for nine months prior to sentencing. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.10–11.) During this time,
he took random UA tests twice a week, and he never failed a test. (Tr. Vol. II, p.9, Ls.11–14.) He
also obtained steady employment with Southern Field Welding. (R., p.106; Tr. Vol. II, p.11,
Ls.17–18.) To stay busy, he volunteered to work extra hours and overtime. (Tr. Vol. II, p.10,
Ls.14–18.) Southern Field Welding wrote a letter of support to the district court, stating that
Mr. Aguinaga had “done a very good job since he started his employment.” (R., p.106.) They
wrote that Mr. Aguinaga was “very prompt,” “never late to work,” “very responsible,” and
“dedicated to his job.” (R., p.106.) They described him as “a great asset to our team” and “key to
our success.” (R., p.106.) They were willing to work with his probation officer and the district
court so he could continue to work while complying with any terms of supervision. (R., p.106.)
They “strongly believe[d] that Florencio is genuinely trying to improve his life and wants to turn
to a new chapter that doesn’t involve trouble with Law Enforcement and our Judicial System.”
(R., p.106.) Mr. Aguinaga’s sobriety and employment stand in favor of mitigation.
In addition to his positive pre-sentencing behavior, Mr. Aguinaga had a strong support
network and was motivated to change. Mr. Aguinaga regretted drinking alcohol. (PSI, p.4.) He
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started drinking alcohol as a teenager, but he has had long periods of sobriety. (PSI, p.20.) He
recognized that his alcohol consumption contributed to his criminal behavior. (PSI, p.22.) In
describing the instant offense, he wrote, “I placed my life, health, and community at risk.” (PSI,
p.4.) At sentencing, he characterized his arrest as “a blessing.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.11, Ls.9–10.) He
stated that he had “a true desire, a genuine desire to stay clean and sober.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.14,
Ls.3–4.) Similarly, the GAIN Evaluation found that his responses indicated a high motivation for
treatment. (PSI, p.29.) His rationale for staying sober was not about avoiding jail time, but
“about wanting to stay clean and keep it that way for my family, for society, for my job, and for
everyone involved in my life.” (Tr. Vol. II, p.14, Ls.5–9.) He wanted to take advantage of the
programming provided during a period of retained jurisdiction or in DUI Court. (Tr. Vol. II,
p.12, Ls.7–12.) Additionally, Mr. Aguinaga had a great relationship with his parents. (PSI, p.16.)
He lived with them since 2010. (PSI, pp.16–17.) A co-worker and friend also wrote a letter of
support. (R., p.107.) He described Mr. Aguinaga as of “very good moral character,”
“hardworking,” and “dedicated.” (R., p.107.) He wrote that Mr. Aguinaga was never late for
work, never left a job unfinished, and volunteered to work on Sunday. (R., p.107.) This coworker and friend had “no doubts about his abilities to succeed.” (R., p.107.) Mr. Aguinaga’s
commitment to staying sober and his support network also supported a lesser sentence.
In conclusion, the mitigating factors in this case did not justify a prison sentence for
Mr. Aguinaga. The district court should have retained jurisdiction or suspended Mr. Aguinaga’s
sentence in order for him to participate in DUI Court. By failing to give adequate weight to the
mitigating circumstances in this case, the district court did not exercise reason and thus abused
its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Aguinaga respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
judgment of conviction and remand his case for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 9th day of August, 2018.

/s/ Jenny C. Swinford
JENNY C. SWINFORD
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 9th day of August, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, electronically as follows:
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
Delivered via e-mail to: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant
JCS/eas
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